The Source of about Half of the Gap Between Judgements of Male and Female CVs in Economics at Promotion Time—A Conjecture

Link to video of the “Conference on Diversity and Inclusion in Economics, Finance, and Central Banking November 9, 2021” on YouTube

It would be good to have more women in economic research. The conference shown above is just one example of official concern about not having enough women in economics. There is some evidence that even given quantitatively similar CVs, by all the measures used by economists who study publishing in economics, women fare worse in tenure and other promotion decisions. Why might this be? Let me propose a mechanism in which everyone might try to judge as fairly as possible and still collectively judge in an unfair way.

Bean-counting does not do enough to adjust for the vastly different qualities of papers that appear in the same journal. So there is something valuable about having a promotion committee read the papers of someone up for promotion to see how impressive they are. One key factor in judging the importance of an economics paper is, and should be, a judgement about the importance of the question the paper addresses. However, men and women are on average interested in different questions, and so these two groups will differ systematically in their judgements about the importance of the questions are that are addressed by the one up for promotion. Men up for promotion are on average more likely to have chosen questions for their research that men judge as important, while women up for promotion are on average more likely to have chosen questions for their research that women judge as important. When those voting on a promotion are mostly male, this puts women at a disadvantage.

Note that when looking at promotion prospects for men and women, what matters is always how those voting on the promotion deal with marginal cases. So we are talking about folks up for promotion who are either going to barely get through or barely lose out. It is easy for a modest gap in judgements of the importance of research questions to make a difference in those cases.

Note that the gender gap in the judgement of the importance of various research questions has an effect beyond promotion meetings. A senior colleague is more likely to be motivated to give advice and other mentoring on a research project that seems to them to be an important question.

Note that this mechanism could operate without any direct sexism at all—everyone could be indifferent between a man and a woman working on the same topic and there would still be a problem. Abstractly, what is needed is to get to the result one would get to if an equal number of male and female economists were honestly judging how impressive a paper is. If there aren’t an equal number of male and female economists doing the judging, that won’t happen automatically.

I am of course taking the philosophical position that the research questions that women think are important matter just as much as the research questions that men think are important. That sounds uncontroversial, but think through what that means in terms of the specific types of research questions that are upgraded in importance when women’s judgements are given an equal weight to men’s judgements as if there were an equal number of men and women in economics. In terms of fields, questions in applied micro fields, broadly writ, would likely be upgraded. And I think Behavioral Economics questions would likely be upgraded. Abstract theory questions would likely be somewhat downgraded (but one should not exaggerate how much).

You Probably Need More Vitamin D

Inspired by Carola Binder’s guest post “Why You Should Get More Vitamin D: The Recommended Daily Allowance for Vitamin D Was Underestimated Due to Statistical Illiteracy,” I take 5000 IU of Vitamin D each day when I am not fasting. (That is one very small pill. I buy them at Costco.) Two simple facts also reinforce for me the importance of Vitamin D:

  1. Many diseases have worse incidence in high latitudes; something not so easy to explain by confounding factors other than the sunlight that produces Vitamin D.

  2. Folks like me whose ancestors lived in high latitudes for a few thousand years are white, despite being descended further back from black Africans. The only plausible reason is that folks with darker skins couldn’t produce enough Vitamin D in places with weaker sun exposure. Vitamin D has to be a big deal to cause evolution of skin color that fast.

A friend recently pointed me to a website, vitamindwiki.com, that might go overboard in its advocacy for Vitamin D, but does marshal an impressive array of facts and citations that, properly winnowed, backs up this view of the importance of Vitamin D. I give links to three of its posts underneath the screenshots at the top of this post.

Among the supplements I take, I don’t take many vitamins. Indeed, as I’ll write about later, I worry that taking a multivitamin too often might help provide cancer the vitamins it needs and so foster cancer. But I do take Vitamin D supplements.

Appendix: Here is a post on another website on latitude and disease:

The Federalist Papers #47: Separating Legislative, Executive and Judicial Powers is a Good Principle, But Perfection in this Regard is Impossible—James Madison

In the Federalist Papers, Alexander Hamilton and James Madison have severe words for many of the opponents of the proposed Constitution. But in the Federalist Papers #47, there is one objection to the proposed Constitution that James Madison treats as a legitimate objection if true—though factually inaccurate:

One of the principal objections inculcated by the more respectable adversaries to the Constitution, is its supposed violation of the political maxim, that the legislative, executive, and judiciary departments ought to be separate and distinct. …

The accumulation of all powers, legislative, executive, and judiciary, in the same hands, whether of one, a few, or many, and whether hereditary, selfappointed, or elective, may justly be pronounced the very definition of tyranny. Were the federal Constitution, therefore, really chargeable with the accumulation of power, or with a mixture of powers, having a dangerous tendency to such an accumulation, no further arguments would be necessary to inspire a universal reprobation of the system.

James Madison then goes on to say that Montesquieu was one of the foremost advocates of the separation of powers, yet saw the British Constitution as a model of this:

The oracle who is always consulted and cited on this subject is the celebrated Montesquieu. If he be not the author of this invaluable precept in the science of politics, he has the merit at least of displaying and recommending it most effectually to the attention of mankind.… The British Constitution was to Montesquieu what Homer has been to the didactic writers on epic poetry. As the latter have considered the work of the immortal bard as the perfect model from which the principles and rules of the epic art were to be drawn, and by which all similar works were to be judged, so this great political critic appears to have viewed the Constitution of England as the standard, or to use his own expression, as the mirror of political liberty …

James Madison points out that in the British political system of the time, the separation of powers was not complete:

On the slightest view of the British Constitution, we must perceive that the legislative, executive, and judiciary departments are by no means totally separate and distinct from each other.

He then goes through many details to demonstrate this incomplete separation in the British political system and then the constitutions of many states in order to show that none managed a perfect separation of powers—and indeed the details suggest that in all of these the separation of powers is less perfect than in the proposed Constitution of the United States.

At all points in the Federalist Papers #47, James Madison evinces a strong belief in the principle of the separation of powers, while showing that even the many states that explicitly state in their constitutions that there should be separation of powers are not able to separate them perfectly. Indeed, no political system in view had a perfect separation of powers.

The full text of the Federalist Papers #47 is copied out below so you can see the detailed examples James Madison gives.

FEDERALIST NO. 47

The Particular Structure of the New Government and the Distribution of Power Among Its Different Parts

From the New York Packet
Friday, February 1, 1788.

Author: James Madison

To the People of the State of New York:

HAVING reviewed the general form of the proposed government and the general mass of power allotted to it, I proceed to examine the particular structure of this government, and the distribution of this mass of power among its constituent parts. One of the principal objections inculcated by the more respectable adversaries to the Constitution, is its supposed violation of the political maxim, that the legislative, executive, and judiciary departments ought to be separate and distinct. In the structure of the federal government, no regard, it is said, seems to have been paid to this essential precaution in favor of liberty. The several departments of power are distributed and blended in such a manner as at once to destroy all symmetry and beauty of form, and to expose some of the essential parts of the edifice to the danger of being crushed by the disproportionate weight of other parts. No political truth is certainly of greater intrinsic value, or is stamped with the authority of more enlightened patrons of liberty, than that on which the objection is founded.

The accumulation of all powers, legislative, executive, and judiciary, in the same hands, whether of one, a few, or many, and whether hereditary, selfappointed, or elective, may justly be pronounced the very definition of tyranny. Were the federal Constitution, therefore, really chargeable with the accumulation of power, or with a mixture of powers, having a dangerous tendency to such an accumulation, no further arguments would be necessary to inspire a universal reprobation of the system. I persuade myself, however, that it will be made apparent to every one, that the charge cannot be supported, and that the maxim on which it relies has been totally misconceived and misapplied. In order to form correct ideas on this important subject, it will be proper to investigate the sense in which the preservation of liberty requires that the three great departments of power should be separate and distinct. The oracle who is always consulted and cited on this subject is the celebrated Montesquieu. If he be not the author of this invaluable precept in the science of politics, he has the merit at least of displaying and recommending it most effectually to the attention of mankind. Let us endeavor, in the first place, to ascertain his meaning on this point. The British Constitution was to Montesquieu what Homer has been to the didactic writers on epic poetry. As the latter have considered the work of the immortal bard as the perfect model from which the principles and rules of the epic art were to be drawn, and by which all similar works were to be judged, so this great political critic appears to have viewed the Constitution of England as the standard, or to use his own expression, as the mirror of political liberty; and to have delivered, in the form of elementary truths, the several characteristic principles of that particular system. That we may be sure, then, not to mistake his meaning in this case, let us recur to the source from which the maxim was drawn. On the slightest view of the British Constitution, we must perceive that the legislative, executive, and judiciary departments are by no means totally separate and distinct from each other. The executive magistrate forms an integral part of the legislative authority. He alone has the prerogative of making treaties with foreign sovereigns, which, when made, have, under certain limitations, the force of legislative acts. All the members of the judiciary department are appointed by him, can be removed by him on the address of the two Houses of Parliament, and form, when he pleases to consult them, one of his constitutional councils. One branch of the legislative department forms also a great constitutional council to the executive chief, as, on another hand, it is the sole depositary of judicial power in cases of impeachment, and is invested with the supreme appellate jurisdiction in all other cases. The judges, again, are so far connected with the legislative department as often to attend and participate in its deliberations, though not admitted to a legislative vote. From these facts, by which Montesquieu was guided, it may clearly be inferred that, in saying "There can be no liberty where the legislative and executive powers are united in the same person, or body of magistrates," or, "if the power of judging be not separated from the legislative and executive powers," he did not mean that these departments ought to have no PARTIAL AGENCY in, or no CONTROL over, the acts of each other. His meaning, as his own words import, and still more conclusively as illustrated by the example in his eye, can amount to no more than this, that where the WHOLE power of one department is exercised by the same hands which possess the WHOLE power of another department, the fundamental principles of a free constitution are subverted. This would have been the case in the constitution examined by him, if the king, who is the sole executive magistrate, had possessed also the complete legislative power, or the supreme administration of justice; or if the entire legislative body had possessed the supreme judiciary, or the supreme executive authority. This, however, is not among the vices of that constitution. The magistrate in whom the whole executive power resides cannot of himself make a law, though he can put a negative on every law; nor administer justice in person, though he has the appointment of those who do administer it. The judges can exercise no executive prerogative, though they are shoots from the executive stock; nor any legislative function, though they may be advised with by the legislative councils. The entire legislature can perform no judiciary act, though by the joint act of two of its branches the judges may be removed from their offices, and though one of its branches is possessed of the judicial power in the last resort. The entire legislature, again, can exercise no executive prerogative, though one of its branches constitutes the supreme executive magistracy, and another, on the impeachment of a third, can try and condemn all the subordinate officers in the executive department. The reasons on which Montesquieu grounds his maxim are a further demonstration of his meaning. "When the legislative and executive powers are united in the same person or body," says he, "there can be no liberty, because apprehensions may arise lest THE SAME monarch or senate should ENACT tyrannical laws to EXECUTE them in a tyrannical manner. " Again: "Were the power of judging joined with the legislative, the life and liberty of the subject would be exposed to arbitrary control, for THE JUDGE would then be THE LEGISLATOR.

Were it joined to the executive power, THE JUDGE might behave with all the violence of AN OPPRESSOR. " Some of these reasons are more fully explained in other passages; but briefly stated as they are here, they sufficiently establish the meaning which we have put on this celebrated maxim of this celebrated author.

If we look into the constitutions of the several States, we find that, notwithstanding the emphatical and, in some instances, the unqualified terms in which this axiom has been laid down, there is not a single instance in which the several departments of power have been kept absolutely separate and distinct. New Hampshire, whose constitution was the last formed, seems to have been fully aware of the impossibility and inexpediency of avoiding any mixture whatever of these departments, and has qualified the doctrine by declaring "that the legislative, executive, and judiciary powers ought to be kept as separate from, and independent of, each other AS THE NATURE OF A FREE GOVERNMENT WILL ADMIT; OR AS IS CONSISTENT WITH THAT CHAIN OF CONNECTION THAT BINDS THE WHOLE FABRIC OF THE CONSTITUTION IN ONE INDISSOLUBLE BOND OF UNITY AND AMITY. " Her constitution accordingly mixes these departments in several respects. The Senate, which is a branch of the legislative department, is also a judicial tribunal for the trial of impeachments. The President, who is the head of the executive department, is the presiding member also of the Senate; and, besides an equal vote in all cases, has a casting vote in case of a tie. The executive head is himself eventually elective every year by the legislative department, and his council is every year chosen by and from the members of the same department. Several of the officers of state are also appointed by the legislature. And the members of the judiciary department are appointed by the executive department. The constitution of Massachusetts has observed a sufficient though less pointed caution, in expressing this fundamental article of liberty. It declares "that the legislative department shall never exercise the executive and judicial powers, or either of them; the executive shall never exercise the legislative and judicial powers, or either of them; the judicial shall never exercise the legislative and executive powers, or either of them. " This declaration corresponds precisely with the doctrine of Montesquieu, as it has been explained, and is not in a single point violated by the plan of the convention. It goes no farther than to prohibit any one of the entire departments from exercising the powers of another department. In the very Constitution to which it is prefixed, a partial mixture of powers has been admitted. The executive magistrate has a qualified negative on the legislative body, and the Senate, which is a part of the legislature, is a court of impeachment for members both of the executive and judiciary departments. The members of the judiciary department, again, are appointable by the executive department, and removable by the same authority on the address of the two legislative branches.

Lastly, a number of the officers of government are annually appointed by the legislative department. As the appointment to offices, particularly executive offices, is in its nature an executive function, the compilers of the Constitution have, in this last point at least, violated the rule established by themselves. I pass over the constitutions of Rhode Island and Connecticut, because they were formed prior to the Revolution, and even before the principle under examination had become an object of political attention. The constitution of New York contains no declaration on this subject; but appears very clearly to have been framed with an eye to the danger of improperly blending the different departments. It gives, nevertheless, to the executive magistrate, a partial control over the legislative department; and, what is more, gives a like control to the judiciary department; and even blends the executive and judiciary departments in the exercise of this control. In its council of appointment members of the legislative are associated with the executive authority, in the appointment of officers, both executive and judiciary. And its court for the trial of impeachments and correction of errors is to consist of one branch of the legislature and the principal members of the judiciary department. The constitution of New Jersey has blended the different powers of government more than any of the preceding. The governor, who is the executive magistrate, is appointed by the legislature; is chancellor and ordinary, or surrogate of the State; is a member of the Supreme Court of Appeals, and president, with a casting vote, of one of the legislative branches. The same legislative branch acts again as executive council of the governor, and with him constitutes the Court of Appeals. The members of the judiciary department are appointed by the legislative department and removable by one branch of it, on the impeachment of the other. According to the constitution of Pennsylvania, the president, who is the head of the executive department, is annually elected by a vote in which the legislative department predominates. In conjunction with an executive council, he appoints the members of the judiciary department, and forms a court of impeachment for trial of all officers, judiciary as well as executive. The judges of the Supreme Court and justices of the peace seem also to be removable by the legislature; and the executive power of pardoning in certain cases, to be referred to the same department. The members of the executive counoil are made EX-OFFICIO justices of peace throughout the State. In Delaware, the chief executive magistrate is annually elected by the legislative department. The speakers of the two legislative branches are vice-presidents in the executive department. The executive chief, with six others, appointed, three by each of the legislative branches constitutes the Supreme Court of Appeals; he is joined with the legislative department in the appointment of the other judges. Throughout the States, it appears that the members of the legislature may at the same time be justices of the peace; in this State, the members of one branch of it are EX-OFFICIO justices of the peace; as are also the members of the executive council. The principal officers of the executive department are appointed by the legislative; and one branch of the latter forms a court of impeachments. All officers may be removed on address of the legislature. Maryland has adopted the maxim in the most unqualified terms; declaring that the legislative, executive, and judicial powers of government ought to be forever separate and distinct from each other. Her constitution, notwithstanding, makes the executive magistrate appointable by the legislative department; and the members of the judiciary by the executive department. The language of Virginia is still more pointed on this subject. Her constitution declares, "that the legislative, executive, and judiciary departments shall be separate and distinct; so that neither exercise the powers properly belonging to the other; nor shall any person exercise the powers of more than one of them at the same time, except that the justices of county courts shall be eligible to either House of Assembly. " Yet we find not only this express exception, with respect to the members of the inferior courts, but that the chief magistrate, with his executive council, are appointable by the legislature; that two members of the latter are triennially displaced at the pleasure of the legislature; and that all the principal offices, both executive and judiciary, are filled by the same department. The executive prerogative of pardon, also, is in one case vested in the legislative department. The constitution of North Carolina, which declares "that the legislative, executive, and supreme judicial powers of government ought to be forever separate and distinct from each other," refers, at the same time, to the legislative department, the appointment not only of the executive chief, but all the principal officers within both that and the judiciary department. In South Carolina, the constitution makes the executive magistracy eligible by the legislative department.

It gives to the latter, also, the appointment of the members of the judiciary department, including even justices of the peace and sheriffs; and the appointment of officers in the executive department, down to captains in the army and navy of the State.

In the constitution of Georgia, where it is declared "that the legislative, executive, and judiciary departments shall be separate and distinct, so that neither exercise the powers properly belonging to the other," we find that the executive department is to be filled by appointments of the legislature; and the executive prerogative of pardon to be finally exercised by the same authority. Even justices of the peace are to be appointed by the legislature. In citing these cases, in which the legislative, executive, and judiciary departments have not been kept totally separate and distinct, I wish not to be regarded as an advocate for the particular organizations of the several State governments. I am fully aware that among the many excellent principles which they exemplify, they carry strong marks of the haste, and still stronger of the inexperience, under which they were framed. It is but too obvious that in some instances the fundamental principle under consideration has been violated by too great a mixture, and even an actual consolidation, of the different powers; and that in no instance has a competent provision been made for maintaining in practice the separation delineated on paper. What I have wished to evince is, that the charge brought against the proposed Constitution, of violating the sacred maxim of free government, is warranted neither by the real meaning annexed to that maxim by its author, nor by the sense in which it has hitherto been understood in America. This interesting subject will be resumed in the ensuing paper.

PUBLIUS.

Links to my other posts on The Federalist Papers so far:

Supply-Side Progressivism—Ezra Klein

I think of the history of “Liberalism” as being much more illustrious than the history of “Progressivism,” and so favor the word “Liberal,” but the “Supply-Side Progressivism” that Ezra Klein has begun advocating is very much in the spirit of the “Supply-Side Liberalism” I have been advocating on this blog since 2012. (See “What is a Supply-Side Liberal?”)

Let me dive into Ezra Klein’s September 19, 2021 New York Times op-ed “The Economic Mistake the Left Is Finally Confronting” in some detail. The phrase “Supply-Side Progressivism” is in the link, making me think that was a working title: https://www.nytimes.com/2021/09/19/opinion/supply-side-progressivism.html

Ezra begins by detailing a set of policies he calls “demand-side,” but that I would call redistributionary policies. I think of demand-side policies as limited to the management of aggregate demand. (Note that I view redistribution as a very good thing whenever it doesn’t hurt the supply side too badly.) Then Ezra quotes the paper “Cost Disease Socialism” by Steven Teles, Samuel Hammond and Daniel Takashto make the case that costs matter:

We are in an era of spiraling costs for core social goods — health care, housing, education, child care — which has made proposals to socialize those costs enormously compelling for many on the progressive left. This can result in a vicious cycle in which subsidies for supply-constrained goods or services merely push up prices, necessitating greater subsidies, which then push up prices, ad infinitum,” they write.

Ezra goes on to lay out some excellent supply-side policy ideas. Let me list them and quote his explanation of each:

1. Increasing direct government support for drug development while reducing drug prices (through either government price negotiation or lessened patent protection):

We should combine price controls with new policies to encourage drug development. That could include everything from more funding of basic research to huge prizes for discovering drugs that treat particular conditions to more public funding for drug trials. Years ago, Bernie Sanders had an interesting proposal for creating a system of pharmaceutical prizes in which companies could make millions or billions for inventing drugs that cured certain conditions, and those drugs would be immediately released without exclusive patent protections. Focusing on the need to make new drugs affordable while ignoring the need to make more of them exist is like trimming a garden you’ve stopped watering.

2. Focusing on speeding up innovation that will help slow climate change:

Climate change is the most pressing example. If the Biden administration gave every American a check to transition to renewables, the policy would fail, because we haven’t built that much renewable capacity, to say nothing of the supply chain needed to deploy and maintain it. In a world where two-thirds of emissions now come from middle-income countries like China and India, the only way for humanity to both address climate change and poverty is to invent our way to clean energy that is plentiful and cheap and then spend enough to rapidly deploy it.

3. Increasing the national and state role in housing policy (as opposed to almost total control by local governments that don’t internalize the benefit of more housing to people who want to move to that locality):

Biden has proposed an expansive plan to increase housing supply in part by pushing local governments to end exclusionary zoning laws. And in California, that’s exactly what’s happening, as I wrote a few weeks back. A decade ago, progressives talked often of making housing affordable, but they didn’t talk much about increasing housing supply. Now they do. That’s progress.

Ezra Klein could have added:

4. Reducing the overgrowth of occupational licensing:

The Obama-era Treasury did some good work on this. I have touched on the scourge of excessive occupational licensing in several posts. See:

Conclusion. There is a lot more to Supply-Side Liberalism on this blog, but all of these fit nicely within Supply-Side Liberalism. Even in a time of extraordinary political polarization, I think there is the realistic potential for even more bipartisan efforts for 2, 3 and 4. And even 1, drug price controls/lower negotiated prices combined with other incentives and support for drug innovation could succeed given widespread support on the part of the electorate for lower drug prices.

A Fact to Keep in Mind When Parsing the Rise in Obesity: The Decline in Smoking Needs to Be Taken into Account

The decline of smoking has made a huge contribution to health. It has also made the obesity statistics look worse. That is especially important to take into account when making inferences from the time series of obesity about the cause of the rise in obesity. The timemoldslimemold blog made part of its argument for environmental contaminants as a cause of obesity from the increase in obesity after 1980, right when smoking was declining. That isn’t the only evidence for the importance of environmental contaminants: wild animals getting fatter and low altitudes being correlated with obesity are especially persuasive. But the time series is part of the argument. All of these possible causes of the rise in obesity should be taken seriously. A multiple-cause story is much more likely to fit the facts.

Here are my blog posts related to the idea that environmental contaminants help contribute to the rise of obesity:

I don’t think I ever relied too heavily on the time series of obesity in judging the argument, since I already thought there were other missing variables—for instance, the distribution in the population of the length of the typical eating window during a day. So I think my posts don’t have to be discounted much at all because of the added complication of the decline of smoking. But some of slimemoldtimemold’s posts that I was riffing on verged a little much toward a monocausal explanation at times.

As I have said many times, the statistical and theoretical issues around explaining the rise of obesity are quite tricky and could be much clarified from having many economists dive deeply into them. Training in economics gives one the right statistical background for epidemiological issues. And economists experiences with economic theory are good mental training for understanding biological mechanisms, despite their different character from economic forces. If you are an economist and want a shot at doing more than $100,000,000,000 worth of good in the world, trying to figure out the causes of the rise in obesity is a great strategy. My advice: Don’t stick to the economists’ lane on this. Go and invade (or be an illegal immigrant in) the territory of the epidemiologists and biologists and dietitians. That is where I think the gold is to be found. If any other economist scolds you for taking on this challenge, I am happy to scold them for scolding you.

Jordan Peterson: No One Gets Away with Anything

The Book of Mormon says 4 times that “no unclean thing” can “dwell with God”/“inherit the kingdom of heaven”/“enter into his kingdom”:

  • Wherefore, if ye have sought to do wickedly in the days of your probation, then ye are found unclean before the judgment-seat of God; and no unclean thing can dwell with God; wherefore, ye must be cast off forever. (1 Nephi 10:21)

  • And I say unto you again that he cannot save them in their sins; for I cannot deny his word, and he hath said that no unclean thing can inherit the kingdom of heaven; therefore, how can ye be saved, except ye inherit the kingdom of heaven? Therefore, ye cannot be saved in your sins. (Alma 11:27)

  • But behold, an awful death cometh upon the wicked; for they die as to things pertaining to things of righteousness; for they are unclean, and no unclean thing can inherit the kingdom of God; but they are cast out, and consigned to partake of the fruits of their labors or their works, which have been evil; and they drink the dregs of a bitter cup. (Alma 40:26)

  • And no unclean thing can enter into his kingdom; therefore nothing entereth into his rest save it be those who have washed their garments in my blood, because of their faith, and the repentance of all their sins, and their faithfulness unto the end. (3 Nephi 27:19)

(Thanks to https://quod.lib.umich.edu/m/mormon/simple.html for enabling this simple search of the Book of Mormon.) When I was a believing Mormon, this scared me—in a way that probably had good effects on my behavior.

On a lot of fronts, Jordan Peterson has done a brilliant job of giving powerful nonsupernaturalist interpretation of sacred texts. His book Maps of Meaning: The Architecture of Belief goes into the most detail on that front. But his other books, 12 Rules for Life: An Antidote to Chaos and Beyond Order: 12 More Rules for Life do a fair bit of this. In everything I am aware of (which also includes many YouTube videos, though a small fraction of his total stock), he has not touched on the Book of Mormon. Yet, he gives a good nonsupernaturalist interpretation of “no unclean thing can inherit the kingdom of heaven” when he says “No one gets away with anything.”

In this post I have two different versions of his bit elaborating on “No one gets away with anything.” The video at the top of this post is a 3-and-a-half minute clip. The other version is last 14 minutes of his lecture on meaning for moderns of the story of Abraham is the other. That starts at the 46:00 mark, where he is saying “You wake up in the morning, and what do you have in front of you?” (The 14 minutes are followed by a Q&A that is also interesting, but deals with different topics.)

Now I’m scared again.

An Example of Ideology Leading to Bad Statistics and Social Injustice

My post “Adding a Variable Measured with Error to a Regression Only Partially Controls for that Variable” scolds statistical practitioners for all too often assume that adding a variable to a regression controls for that variable, when almost all such variables are measured with error. The math then shows that adding a variable measured with classical error yields a result between what one would get with a pristine version of the added variable measured without error and omitting that variable entirely. Thus, adding a variable measured with error only partially controls for that variable.

But there is something worse than pretending to control for a variable by adding an error-ridden measure of it without adjustment for measurement error: not trying to control for confounding factors at all.

To me, a principle of social justice is that we should do more for people who are worse off, especially when being worse off makes the same amount of resources more effective at helping someone. On average, in our society, being a racial minority puts people at a disadvantage. But it is not true that all Black people are worse off than all White people. In the extreme, other things equal, would you rather be a Black billionaire or a White homeless person?

It is a very interesting question how the overall well-being of Black and White people of equal income compares on average. Racism in all probability still makes it harder on average to be Black even at an equal income. But noticing that an important part of the disadvantage of Blacks is reflected in lower income is surely important.

New York’s current policy on the rationing of scarce COVID-19 treatments provides a useful thought experiment to think about both these statistical and these social justice issues. What I know about this is from John Judis and Ruy Teixeira’s January 7, 2021 Wall Street Journal op-ed “New York’s Race-Based Preferential Covid Treatments.”

Jon and Ruy begin by saying:

New York state recently published guidelines for dispensing potentially life-saving monoclonal antibodies and oral antivirals like Paxlovid to people suffering from mild to moderate symptoms of Covid-19. These treatments are in short supply, and they must be allocated to those most in need.

According to these guidelines, sick people who have tested positive for Covid should be eligible to receive these drugs if they have “a medical condition or other factors that increase their risk for severe illness.” These include standard criteria like age and comorbidities like cancer, diabetes and heart disease—but, startlingly, they also include simply being of “non-white race or Hispanic/Latino ethnicity,” which “should be considered a risk factor, as longstanding systemic health and social inequities have contributed to an increased risk of severe illness and death from COVID-19.”

Using racial data would be appropriate in this context if we didn’t have income to go by. But making race a criterion for scarce health resources without also making income a criterion as seems unfair.

As far as we know, COVID-19 is not a disease like sickle-cell anemia where genetic differences put Blacks at greater danger. Jon and Ruy write:

There isn’t any study we have seen that, controlling for other factors, such as income, education and residence, shows clearly that Americans of Hispanic, African or Asian ancestry are at greater risk for severe Covid-19.

Of course race is correlated with Covid-19 incidence, in a big way. The question is whether that is operating through income and education or needs to be accounted for by a separate causality. Jon and Ruy argue:

It is probable that a good part—perhaps most—of the observed racial disparity in Covid effects is attributable to factors that can be loosely grouped under class: income, education, poverty status, occupation, health-insurance status, housing and so on. The way to test this would have been to collect individual-level data on such variables in addition to race, ethnicity, age and gender. But that has not been done, so only racial disparities, uncontrolled for class factors, have been reported.

As one example of what such studies might find, Kaiser Family Foundation survey data on vaccination rates revealed that black and white college graduates were vaccinated at roughly equal (high) rates, while there was a yawning chasm between these college graduates and their noncollege counterparts of the same race. Clearly then, the observed disparities in vaccination rates between blacks and whites have a lot to do with the higher noncollege proportion among the black population.

Many people in our nation face big difficulties. We should be helping people in trouble.

As a side note, there is a crucial underdiscussed dimension in which we don’t treat poor people very well in this country—and in particular don’t treat poor Black people well: rich people use exclusionary single-family house zoning to keep poor people—and perhaps especially poor black people—out of their neighborhoods and out of their kids’ schools. Poor kids (including poor black kids) on average get a worse education and also lose out on the advice and connections that having at least some rich neighbors could help with. To me, this is one of the best examples of structural racism. It doesn’t make any sense to talk about structural racism in general without talking about this elephant in the room (or “elephant in the neighborhood”). I would at least like to have people be put on the spot trying to justify something that has a disparate impact through such an unfair mechanism. I think it would be quite possible for a good reporter to quite appropriately make a lot of people look really bad in this context. And that might lead to some constructive change.

Note that as long as Black people are in an initial condition that leaves them poorer, for whatever reason, anything that is unfair to poor people should count as structural racism because being unfair to poor people is going to slow down any possible convergence in status between Black and White people. And I suspect that there is an interaction between racism and poverty that disadvantages poor Blacks compared to poor Whites more than rich Blacks are disadvantaged compared to rich Whites.

Sanjay Gupta's Five Pillars of Brain Health: Move, Discover, Relax, Nourish, Connect

Sanjay Gupta’s book Keep Sharp: Build a Better Brain at Any Age is all about improving cognitive functioning. Early in the book, Sanjay points to five pillars of brain health. As a teaser for the book, let me quote a bit on each of these five pillars, adding :

Move. … Exercise, both aerobic and nonaerobic (strength training), is not only good for the body; it’s even better for the brain. … Physical exertion, in fact, has thus far been the only thing we’ve scientifically documented to improve brain health and function. … the connection between physical fitness and brain fitness is clear, direct, and powerful. Movement can increase your brainpower by helping to increase, repair, and maintain brain cells, and it makes you more productive and more alert throughout the day. … it’s stunning.

Discover. … picking up a new hobby, like painting or digital photography, or even learning a new piece of software or language can strengthen the brain. Doing something new can even be seeing a 3D movie, joining a new club, or even using your nondominant hand to brush your teeth.

Relax. … Scores of well-designed studies … routinely show that poor sleep can lead to impaired memory and that chronic stress can impair your ability to learn and adapt to new situations. … multitasking can slow your thinking. Stress is particularly subversive. … find ways to unwind …

Nourish. … we finally have evidence to show that consuming certain foods (e.g., cold-water fish, whole grains, extra virgin olive oil, nuts and seeds, fibrous whole fruits and vegetables) while limiting certain other foods (those high in sugar, saturated fat, and trans-fatty acids) can help avoid memory and brain decline, protect the brain against disease, and maximize its performance. … This conversation extends to the health of our microbial partners as well. The human gut microbiome—the trillions of bacteria that make their home inside our intestines—have a profound role in the health and functioning of our brains …

Connect. … A 2015 study, among many others, tells us that having a diverse social network can improve our brain’s plasticity and help preserve our cognitive abilities. Interacting with others not only helps reduce stress and boosts our immune system; it can also decrease our risk of cognitive decline.

On connect and discover, see:

On nourish see:

On all five, see:

Final Thoughts: I think we are a ways away from a technology that can prevent us from eventually dying of multiple organ failure if we don’t die of something else first. But the more I learn the more things people typically think of as part of aging look like slow degenerative diseases from failure to care for our bodies well. For many people, progressively worse backaches can be prevented by seeing a chiropractor before things get too bad. Regular exercise and fasting and essentially no sugar better replicate what our bodies were designed for in the environment of evolutionary adaptation. Even having a continuing highly interactive role in society as one gets older is likely to better match the environment of evolutionary adaptation, since when old folks were scarce and writing hadn’t been invented, their memories were a crucial source of accumulated knowledge. And before electric lights, most humans, on many nights, had nothing better to do when it got dark than sleep and have sex. And many would have followed the instinct we still have to take an afternoon nap in the heat of the day. So they probably got more sleep than we do. Going contrary to the design parameters of our bodies is likely to make them go on the fritz. Then we blame it on aging, when aging is only a part of what is going.

There is a lot more to be said about how to live a healthier life, not just for your brain but for everything else. Take a look at my bibliographic post “Miles Kimball on Diet and Health: A Reader's Guide.”

The Federalist Papers #46: Cities and States Have a Strong Position in Struggles with the Federal Government—James Madison

Because of the Civil War, the 13th, 14th and 15th amendments to the Constitution, the Great Depression and the great wars of the 20th century, the US federal government is much stronger now than it was between the ratification of the US Constitution and the US Civil War. Yet state and local governments still have a fighting chance in many battles with the federal government. People often deplore the governments of other states and localities resisting the federal government, but support the government of their state or locality resisting the federal government. On the one hand, Republican-dominated states have gone to court to see which bits of Obamacare they could get away with skipping. On the other hand, Democrat-dominated states and cities have gone to court to see how much more welcoming they could be to undocumented immigrants than the spirit of federal immigration law indicates.

In the Federalist Papers #46, James Madison points to some of the wellsprings of popular support for state and local governments in their struggles with the federal government. He writes:

I proceed to inquire whether the federal government or the State governments will have the advantage with regard to the predilection and support of the people.

First, the source of the authority of state and local governments is every bit as lofty as the source of federal government authority. In both cases, their authority derives from the people:

The federal and State governments are in fact but different agents and trustees of the people, constituted with different powers, and designed for different purposes. … the ultimate authority, wherever the derivative may be found, resides in the people alone, and that it will not depend merely on the comparative ambition or address of the different governments, whether either, or which of them, will be able to enlarge its sphere of jurisdiction at the expense of the other.

Seeing federal, state and local government all as agents for the people predicts that the levels of government that promote the policies people like best will have an advantage in the intergovernmental contest for power. To the extent different parts of the country want different things, the ability of state and local governments to tailor the policies they promote to the desires of those in a given area gives them an advantage. To the extent people in a large part of the country want to compel those in a small part of the country to do things a certain way (often because of what is seen as a moral issue), the federal government will have an advantage. More generally, different levels of government may at any given time be more in tune with the people. James Madison says this about what he saw historically and what might happen in the future:

It was, nevertheless, invariably found, after the transient enthusiasm for the early Congresses was over, that the attention and attachment of the people were turned anew to their own particular governments; that the federal council was at no time the idol of popular favor; and that opposition to proposed enlargements of its powers and importance was the side usually taken by the men who wished to build their political consequence on the prepossessions of their fellow-citizens. If, therefore, as has been elsewhere remarked, the people should in future become more partial to the federal than to the State governments, the change can only result from such manifest and irresistible proofs of a better administration, as will overcome all their antecedent propensities. And in that case, the people ought not surely to be precluded from giving most of their confidence where they may discover it to be most due …

Second, state and local governments employ more people. (In 2020, the federal government employed 2.93 million people. State and local governments employed 19.77 million people.) This means that professionally, more people have the interests of state and local governments at heart than the number who professionally have the interests of the federal government at heart. And those who professionally have the interest of a given government at heart are likely to influence their family, friends and acquaintances:

Into the administration of these [the state and local governments] a greater number of individuals will expect to rise. From the gift of these a greater number of offices and emoluments will flow. By the superintending care of these, all the more domestic and personal interests of the people will be regulated and provided for. With the affairs of these, the people will be more familiarly and minutely conversant. And with the members of these, will a greater proportion of the people have the ties of personal acquaintance and friendship, and of family and party attachments; on the side of these, therefore, the popular bias may well be expected most strongly to incline.

Third, there are some things that are simply difficult for the federal government to do—in part because of the larger number of employees of state and local governments than of the federal government:

… it is only within a certain sphere that the federal power can, in the nature of things, be advantageously administered. … members of the federal will be more dependent on the members of the State governments, than the latter will be on the former.

When thinking of other countries where the national government seems to take over many of the jobs that in the US are done by state and local governments, it is important to realize that many other countries only have the population of a US state.

Fourth, a great deal of evidence shows that people who belong to a smaller and a larger group often identify more with the interests of the smaller group. I have spent many hours in meetings demonstrating that academic economists care more about the interests of their Economics department than about the interests of the university as a whole—though they also tend to believe that the interests of the university as a whole would be best served by what the Economics department as a body wants. And typically the economists in each field care more about the interests of their field interests than the interests of the Economics department. James Madison describes this tendency to identify with the local in this way:

A local spirit will infallibly prevail much more in the members of Congress, than a national spirit will prevail in the legislatures of the particular States. Every one knows that a great proportion of the errors committed by the State legislatures proceeds from the disposition of the members to sacrifice the comprehensive and permanent interest of the State, to the particular and separate views of the counties or districts in which they reside. And if they do not sufficiently enlarge their policy to embrace the collective welfare of their particular State, how can it be imagined that they will make the aggregate prosperity of the Union, and the dignity and respectability of its government, the objects of their affections and consultations? For the same reason that the members of the State legislatures will be unlikely to attach themselves sufficiently to national objects, the members of the federal legislature will be likely to attach themselves too much to local objects. The States will be to the latter what counties and towns are to the former. … members have but too frequently displayed the character, rather of partisans of their respective States, than of impartial guardians of a common interest; that where on one occasion improper sacrifices have been made of local considerations, to the aggrandizement of the federal government, the great interests of the nation have suffered on a hundred, from an undue attention to the local prejudices, interests, and views of the particular States.

James Madison goes so far as to use the word “defalcation,” meaning “misappropriate of funds,” to describe how strong an influence state interests can have in federal congressional deliberations:

The motives on the part of the State governments, to augment their prerogatives by defalcations from the federal government, will be overruled by no reciprocal predispositions in the members.

This is the well-known phenomenon of pork-barrel spending.

By contrast, the interests of the national government are no strongly represented in state legislatures and executives. James Madison writes:

If an act of a particular State, though unfriendly to the national government, be generally popular in that State and should not too grossly violate the oaths of the State officers, it is executed immediately and, of course, by means on the spot and depending on the State alone. The opposition of the federal government, or the interposition of federal officers, would but inflame the zeal of all parties on the side of the State, and the evil could not be prevented or repaired, if at all, without the employment of means which must always be resorted to with reluctance and difficulty.

Fifth, states have many levers of power to resist a measure of the federal government:

… should an unwarrantable measure of the federal government be unpopular in particular States, which would seldom fail to be the case, or even a warrantable measure be so, which may sometimes be the case, the means of opposition to it are powerful and at hand. The disquietude of the people; their repugnance and, perhaps, refusal to co-operate with the officers of the Union; the frowns of the executive magistracy of the State; the embarrassments created by legislative devices, which would often be added on such occasions, would oppose, in any State, difficulties not to be despised; would form, in a large State, very serious impediments; and where the sentiments of several adjoining States happened to be in unison, would present obstructions which the federal government would hardly be willing to encounter.

Sixth, if the federal government tried to go against not just the interests of the people in one state, or several, but the interests of the people in almost all the states, the states combined could put up a very strong resistance to the federal government. James Madison explores this case at length. Here are some highlights of that long discussion:

A few representatives of the people would be opposed to the people themselves; or rather one set of representatives would be contending against thirteen sets of representatives, with the whole body of their common constituents on the side of the latter. The only refuge left for those who prophesy the downfall of the State governments is the visionary supposition that the federal government may previously accumulate a military force for the projects of ambition. …

Extravagant as the supposition is, let it however be made. Let a regular army, fully equal to the resources of the country, be formed; and let it be entirely at the devotion of the federal government; still it would not be going too far to say, that the State governments, with the people on their side, would be able to repel the danger. … To these would be opposed a militia … officered by men chosen from among themselves, fighting for their common liberties, and united and conducted by governments possessing their affections and confidence. It may well be doubted, whether a militia thus circumstanced could ever be conquered by such a proportion of regular troops. Those who are best acquainted with the last successful resistance of this country against the British arms, will be most inclined to deny the possibility of it. Besides the advantage of being armed, which the Americans possess over the people of almost every other nation, the existence of subordinate governments, to which the people are attached, and by which the militia officers are appointed, forms a barrier against the enterprises of ambition, more insurmountable than any which a simple government of any form can admit of. Notwithstanding the military establishments in the several kingdoms of Europe, which are carried as far as the public resources will bear, the governments are afraid to trust the people with arms.

To back up James Madison’s argument, imagine the Civil War if twice or almost twice as many states as the Confederacy had arrayed themselves against the federal government. Even now it is hard to see the federal government defeating a coalition of 40 states in armed conflict given how many in the federally-controlled armed forces would desert to the coalition of 40 states.

Some might lament the strength of state and local governments to resist the federal government. But that strength is real, even now.

Below is the full text of the Federalist Papers #46 to provide the context for each quotation above:

FEDERALIST NO. 46

The Influence of the State and Federal Governments Compared

From the New York Packet
Tuesday, January 29, 1788.

Author: James Madison

To the People of the State of New York:

RESUMING the subject of the last paper, I proceed to inquire whether the federal government or the State governments will have the advantage with regard to the predilection and support of the people. Notwithstanding the different modes in which they are appointed, we must consider both of them as substantially dependent on the great body of the citizens of the United States.

I assume this position here as it respects the first, reserving the proofs for another place. The federal and State governments are in fact but different agents and trustees of the people, constituted with different powers, and designed for different purposes. The adversaries of the Constitution seem to have lost sight of the people altogether in their reasonings on this subject; and to have viewed these different establishments, not only as mutual rivals and enemies, but as uncontrolled by any common superior in their efforts to usurp the authorities of each other. These gentlemen must here be reminded of their error. They must be told that the ultimate authority, wherever the derivative may be found, resides in the people alone, and that it will not depend merely on the comparative ambition or address of the different governments, whether either, or which of them, will be able to enlarge its sphere of jurisdiction at the expense of the other. Truth, no less than decency, requires that the event in every case should be supposed to depend on the sentiments and sanction of their common constituents. Many considerations, besides those suggested on a former occasion, seem to place it beyond doubt that the first and most natural attachment of the people will be to the governments of their respective States.

Into the administration of these a greater number of individuals will expect to rise. From the gift of these a greater number of offices and emoluments will flow. By the superintending care of these, all the more domestic and personal interests of the people will be regulated and provided for. With the affairs of these, the people will be more familiarly and minutely conversant. And with the members of these, will a greater proportion of the people have the ties of personal acquaintance and friendship, and of family and party attachments; on the side of these, therefore, the popular bias may well be expected most strongly to incline. Experience speaks the same language in this case. The federal administration, though hitherto very defective in comparison with what may be hoped under a better system, had, during the war, and particularly whilst the independent fund of paper emissions was in credit, an activity and importance as great as it can well have in any future circumstances whatever.

It was engaged, too, in a course of measures which had for their object the protection of everything that was dear, and the acquisition of everything that could be desirable to the people at large. It was, nevertheless, invariably found, after the transient enthusiasm for the early Congresses was over, that the attention and attachment of the people were turned anew to their own particular governments; that the federal council was at no time the idol of popular favor; and that opposition to proposed enlargements of its powers and importance was the side usually taken by the men who wished to build their political consequence on the prepossessions of their fellow-citizens. If, therefore, as has been elsewhere remarked, the people should in future become more partial to the federal than to the State governments, the change can only result from such manifest and irresistible proofs of a better administration, as will overcome all their antecedent propensities. And in that case, the people ought not surely to be precluded from giving most of their confidence where they may discover it to be most due; but even in that case the State governments could have little to apprehend, because it is only within a certain sphere that the federal power can, in the nature of things, be advantageously administered. The remaining points on which I propose to compare the federal and State governments, are the disposition and the faculty they may respectively possess, to resist and frustrate the measures of each other. It has been already proved that the members of the federal will be more dependent on the members of the State governments, than the latter will be on the former. It has appeared also, that the prepossessions of the people, on whom both will depend, will be more on the side of the State governments, than of the federal government. So far as the disposition of each towards the other may be influenced by these causes, the State governments must clearly have the advantage.

But in a distinct and very important point of view, the advantage will lie on the same side. The prepossessions, which the members themselves will carry into the federal government, will generally be favorable to the States; whilst it will rarely happen, that the members of the State governments will carry into the public councils a bias in favor of the general government. A local spirit will infallibly prevail much more in the members of Congress, than a national spirit will prevail in the legislatures of the particular States. Every one knows that a great proportion of the errors committed by the State legislatures proceeds from the disposition of the members to sacrifice the comprehensive and permanent interest of the State, to the particular and separate views of the counties or districts in which they reside. And if they do not sufficiently enlarge their policy to embrace the collective welfare of their particular State, how can it be imagined that they will make the aggregate prosperity of the Union, and the dignity and respectability of its government, the objects of their affections and consultations? For the same reason that the members of the State legislatures will be unlikely to attach themselves sufficiently to national objects, the members of the federal legislature will be likely to attach themselves too much to local objects. The States will be to the latter what counties and towns are to the former. Measures will too often be decided according to their probable effect, not on the national prosperity and happiness, but on the prejudices, interests, and pursuits of the governments and people of the individual States. What is the spirit that has in general characterized the proceedings of Congress? A perusal of their journals, as well as the candid acknowledgments of such as have had a seat in that assembly, will inform us, that the members have but too frequently displayed the character, rather of partisans of their respective States, than of impartial guardians of a common interest; that where on one occasion improper sacrifices have been made of local considerations, to the aggrandizement of the federal government, the great interests of the nation have suffered on a hundred, from an undue attention to the local prejudices, interests, and views of the particular States. I mean not by these reflections to insinuate, that the new federal government will not embrace a more enlarged plan of policy than the existing government may have pursued; much less, that its views will be as confined as those of the State legislatures; but only that it will partake sufficiently of the spirit of both, to be disinclined to invade the rights of the individual States, or the prerogatives of their governments. The motives on the part of the State governments, to augment their prerogatives by defalcations from the federal government, will be overruled by no reciprocal predispositions in the members. Were it admitted, however, that the Federal government may feel an equal disposition with the State governments to extend its power beyond the due limits, the latter would still have the advantage in the means of defeating such encroachments. If an act of a particular State, though unfriendly to the national government, be generally popular in that State and should not too grossly violate the oaths of the State officers, it is executed immediately and, of course, by means on the spot and depending on the State alone. The opposition of the federal government, or the interposition of federal officers, would but inflame the zeal of all parties on the side of the State, and the evil could not be prevented or repaired, if at all, without the employment of means which must always be resorted to with reluctance and difficulty.

On the other hand, should an unwarrantable measure of the federal government be unpopular in particular States, which would seldom fail to be the case, or even a warrantable measure be so, which may sometimes be the case, the means of opposition to it are powerful and at hand. The disquietude of the people; their repugnance and, perhaps, refusal to co-operate with the officers of the Union; the frowns of the executive magistracy of the State; the embarrassments created by legislative devices, which would often be added on such occasions, would oppose, in any State, difficulties not to be despised; would form, in a large State, very serious impediments; and where the sentiments of several adjoining States happened to be in unison, would present obstructions which the federal government would hardly be willing to encounter. But ambitious encroachments of the federal government, on the authority of the State governments, would not excite the opposition of a single State, or of a few States only. They would be signals of general alarm. Every government would espouse the common cause. A correspondence would be opened. Plans of resistance would be concerted. One spirit would animate and conduct the whole. The same combinations, in short, would result from an apprehension of the federal, as was produced by the dread of a foreign, yoke; and unless the projected innovations should be voluntarily renounced, the same appeal to a trial of force would be made in the one case as was made in the other. But what degree of madness could ever drive the federal government to such an extremity. In the contest with Great Britain, one part of the empire was employed against the other.

The more numerous part invaded the rights of the less numerous part. The attempt was unjust and unwise; but it was not in speculation absolutely chimerical. But what would be the contest in the case we are supposing? Who would be the parties? A few representatives of the people would be opposed to the people themselves; or rather one set of representatives would be contending against thirteen sets of representatives, with the whole body of their common constituents on the side of the latter. The only refuge left for those who prophesy the downfall of the State governments is the visionary supposition that the federal government may previously accumulate a military force for the projects of ambition. The reasonings contained in these papers must have been employed to little purpose indeed, if it could be necessary now to disprove the reality of this danger. That the people and the States should, for a sufficient period of time, elect an uninterupted succession of men ready to betray both; that the traitors should, throughout this period, uniformly and systematically pursue some fixed plan for the extension of the military establishment; that the governments and the people of the States should silently and patiently behold the gathering storm, and continue to supply the materials, until it should be prepared to burst on their own heads, must appear to every one more like the incoherent dreams of a delirious jealousy, or the misjudged exaggerations of a counterfeit zeal, than like the sober apprehensions of genuine patriotism.

Extravagant as the supposition is, let it however be made. Let a regular army, fully equal to the resources of the country, be formed; and let it be entirely at the devotion of the federal government; still it would not be going too far to say, that the State governments, with the people on their side, would be able to repel the danger. The highest number to which, according to the best computation, a standing army can be carried in any country, does not exceed one hundredth part of the whole number of souls; or one twenty-fifth part of the number able to bear arms. This proportion would not yield, in the United States, an army of more than twenty-five or thirty thousand men. To these would be opposed a militia amounting to near half a million of citizens with arms in their hands, officered by men chosen from among themselves, fighting for their common liberties, and united and conducted by governments possessing their affections and confidence. It may well be doubted, whether a militia thus circumstanced could ever be conquered by such a proportion of regular troops. Those who are best acquainted with the last successful resistance of this country against the British arms, will be most inclined to deny the possibility of it. Besides the advantage of being armed, which the Americans possess over the people of almost every other nation, the existence of subordinate governments, to which the people are attached, and by which the militia officers are appointed, forms a barrier against the enterprises of ambition, more insurmountable than any which a simple government of any form can admit of. Notwithstanding the military establishments in the several kingdoms of Europe, which are carried as far as the public resources will bear, the governments are afraid to trust the people with arms. And it is not certain, that with this aid alone they would not be able to shake off their yokes. But were the people to possess the additional advantages of local governments chosen by themselves, who could collect the national will and direct the national force, and of officers appointed out of the militia, by these governments, and attached both to them and to the militia, it may be affirmed with the greatest assurance, that the throne of every tyranny in Europe would be speedily overturned in spite of the legions which surround it. Let us not insult the free and gallant citizens of America with the suspicion, that they would be less able to defend the rights of which they would be in actual possession, than the debased subjects of arbitrary power would be to rescue theirs from the hands of their oppressors. Let us rather no longer insult them with the supposition that they can ever reduce themselves to the necessity of making the experiment, by a blind and tame submission to the long train of insidious measures which must precede and produce it. The argument under the present head may be put into a very concise form, which appears altogether conclusive. Either the mode in which the federal government is to be constructed will render it sufficiently dependent on the people, or it will not. On the first supposition, it will be restrained by that dependence from forming schemes obnoxious to their constituents. On the other supposition, it will not possess the confidence of the people, and its schemes of usurpation will be easily defeated by the State governments, who will be supported by the people. On summing up the considerations stated in this and the last paper, they seem to amount to the most convincing evidence, that the powers proposed to be lodged in the federal government are as little formidable to those reserved to the individual States, as they are indispensably necessary to accomplish the purposes of the Union; and that all those alarms which have been sounded, of a meditated and consequential annihilation of the State governments, must, on the most favorable interpretation, be ascribed to the chimerical fears of the authors of them.

PUBLIUS.

Links to my other posts on The Federalist Papers so far: